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Abstract 
 
The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) of Turkey has reoriented 
its country's historical Westward-looking foreign policy towards the Middle East because of a freeze in 
European Union accession, trans-national security issues resulting from the Kurdistan Worker's Party 
(PKK), and the expansion of its economic interests into the region. The United States should take 
careful note of these changes in an effort to mitigate any opposition to the AKP’s policies, as well as to 
better utilize Turkey’s growing clout in the region.  
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Introduction 
 
In the midst of widespread public discontent and massive economic failure, the AKP won an 
overwhelming majority of seats in parliament in 2002. Since then, it has endeavored to change 
Turkey’s lot in the world. While the AKP has changed many aspects of Turkish politics, one of its most 
striking departures from past positions is found within the realm of foreign policy. Turkey’s alignment 
with the Middle East is more apparent now than it ever has been since its establishment as a republic. 
While this shift has not resulted in the complete abandonment of Western organizations and values, the 
AKP’s growing assertiveness when it comes to foreign policy has fortified Turkey’s diplomatic and 
trade relations with the Middle East. This reorientation had three main causes: disruption in the 
European Union’s harmonization process, security challenges in dealing with the terrorist Kurdistan 
Workers' Party (PKK), and the boom in the economy caused by expansion into Middle Eastern 
business. 
Historical Antecedents 
 
 The nation of Turkey as we know it today is the result of the efforts of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
who was very explicit about the foreign policy that he wanted his new nation to pursue. To avoid 
mistakes of the past, Turkey made tackling its domestic issues its number one priority. Atatürk, 
however, wanted Turkey to focus its attention on maintaining national unity and modernizing along 
Western lines. He often described the Middle East as a cesspool that would sap the resources of Turkey. 
He pursued these goals through the development of policies which forced Turks to adopt last names 
and replaced the Ottoman Arabic alphabet with a Romanized one. These policies revealed shrewd 
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realpolitik; the Allied powers had divided the Middle East into their spheres of influence and Turkey 
could in no way compete with them. Atatürk already believed Turkey to be a part of Europe; he just had 
to convince Europe of this fact. 
 After the death of Atatürk, Turkey eased its extreme neutrality and espoused cautious 
opportunism when it came to international affairs. Learning from Turkey’s ill-fated alliance with 
Germany during WWI, İsmet İnönü's government stayed mostly neutral during World War II. When the 
war ended and the Cold War was just beginning, Turkey managed to gain the favor of the West by 
pursuing membership within the North American Treaty Organization (NATO). By joining NATO in 
1952, Turkey could check Russia’s ambitions for the Bosphorus Strait, a threat constantly on the 
nation’s mind for centuries. Entry into NATO was seen as a crowning achievement for Turkey as it 
firmly entrenched Turkey in the West's camp. Turkey would remain staunchly allied with the West for 
decades afterwards. 
            Joining NATO was only the first step. In keeping with Turkey’s Western orientation, Turkey 
continued to join European institutions and organizations, culminating in the European Community’s 
recognition of Turkey as a candidate country in 1999. Being recognized as a candidate country was a 
watershed moment in the relationship between Europe and Turkey. It was in some ways another 
landmark step towards Turkey being considered European; however, to be considered for accession, 
Turkey had to meet the acquis prior to accession talks, an expectation which other candidate nations 
were not required to meet. If Turkey successfully becomes a part of the EU, this action would, in a 
fashion similar to what occurred as a result of their admittance to NATO, help to realign Turkey to the 
Western camp. 
Flirtations with the Middle East in the Modern Era 
 It was not until the 1980s that Turkey began outreach to the Middle East. Until this time, Turkey 
had avoided all entanglements with its former Ottoman provinces. Prime Minister Turgut Özal began a 
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campaign of economic liberalization that was heavily influenced by the revival of free market 
economics by both US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher; he 
attempted to branch out into the Middle East, the Balkans, and further into European markets. In many 
ways, liberalization was a smashing success. From 1975 to 1985, trade as a percentage of GDP 
increased from just 9 percent to 29 percent; GDP in 1975 was $64.5 billion while in 1985 it was 67.5 
billion. Trade as a percentage of 1985’s GDP fell from 29 percent to 23 percent of $244.9 billion GDP 
in 1995.
1
 In 1995, Turkey’s main trading partners were Russia, Ukraine, and Iran. As of 2012, trade as a 
percentage of GDP increased to 49 percent, and Turkey’s main trading partners were Germany, Iraq, 
Iran, and Russia.
23
  
 Elected to parliament for the first time in 1995, the Islamist Refah Party (RP) was only able to 
join the government when it formed a coalition with the Democratic Party in June of the next year. The 
RP sought contacts with many heads of state from Middle Eastern nations, and attempted to create 
Islamic institutions in the Middle East as counterparts to Western organizations. The most important 
and lasting result of these collaborations was the establishment—along with Egypt, Bangladesh, Iran, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Pakistan—of the D-8 (Developing 8).4 Most of the RP’s other 
pursuits either failed tremendously, or were reversed after the military soft coup in 1997, which was 
conducted due to the military’s fears that the RP was pursuing an Islamist agenda. The military was 
concerned that the RP’s outreach to the Middle East was part of a plan to make the Turkish government 
Islamic. As the military sees itself as the stewards of secular Turkish democracy, they acted to remove 
the RP from government.  
Foundations of AKP Foreign Policy 
                                                 
1
 Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 48. 
2
 CIA World Factbook. “Imports Partners of Turkey,” accessed 02/12/2013,  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2061.html#tu 
3
 CIA World Factbook, “Exports Partners of Turkey,” accessed 02/12/2013, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2050.html#tu 
4
 Bilgin, “Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey's Pro-Islamist Parties,” 410. 
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 Economics played a central role in this foreign policy reorientation. It is the brainchild of AKP 
member, former chief adviser to the Prime Minister, and current Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. 
Davutoğlu is one of the premiere voices of the AKP. His vision for the future of Turkey is laid out in 
his book Stratejik Derenlik (Strategic Depth), in which he argues that Turkey needs to accept its 
Ottoman past and realize its potential as a regional actor. He moves away from language that labels 
Turkey as a bridge or barrier, and rebrands it as a central country.
5
 He argues that continuing to ignore 
the Middle East would be an enormous mistake; ignoring the Middle East would not necessarily mean 
that the Middle East would ignore Turkey. By this, Davutoğlu means that Turkey must be proactive in 
the international arena to prevent others from interfering with its ambitions. He argues that Turkey 
should not consider the EU to be the end goal, as it does not look likely that the EU will even accept 
Turkey. Turkey should pursue policies that take into account the EU, but it should also consider other 
alternatives.
6
 His ultimate goal has become known as the “zero problems with neighbors” doctrine, 
which he holds will allow Turkey to access economic opportunities. Davutoğlu wishes to have 
problems with none and great relations with all, which, he believes, would cause increased political 
clout in the region, as well as a more integrated economy with major players in the Middle East. This is 
a departure from past foreign policy where Turkey preferred not to engage with its former Ottoman 
provinces. Now, not only would it engage, it would also seek to create good relations with its neighbors 
in the region. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Kardaş, “Turkey Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles?” 124. 
6
 M. Cüneyt Yenigün, review of Stratejik Derenlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu by Ahmet Davutoğlu, The Turkish 
Yearbook, 2002, 304. 
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The European Union 
 
  As Atatürk believed the future of Turkey to be intertwined with the West, Turkish membership 
in the EU is seen as the logical extension of his plan. The belief among the Kemalist establishment, a 
bloc of officials who follow a hardline adherence to the founding principles of modern Turkey, is that a 
move towards the West is almost always good. Additionally, the Kemalist establishment would no 
doubt celebrate being more entwined with the secular West. Only when a threat to its national security 
has been perceived does the Turkish government separate itself from the West, as when Turkey invaded 
Northern Cyprus. It is no surprise that successive governments have moved in the direction of 
European integration. During the administration of the AKP, however, the EU accession process has 
stalled. This is partly the fault of a lack of an EU consensus on Turkey’s place in Europe,  
 Turkey’s integration into Europe could result in many benefits. Turkish businessmen would be 
highly interested in the increased investment opportunities. The Turkish economy would also benefit 
from increased foreign direct investment from the EU. Turkish citizens would also be able to immigrate 
with more ease to places with higher standards of living. Accession would additionally give Turkey a 
more authoritative voice when it comes to determining EU policies.
7
  
 Turkey's integration into the EU has also been of particular interest to the US, a nation which 
often supports Turkey by pressuring European capitals to continue accession negotiations. In turn, 
during the lead-up to the Iraq War, the US used its increased efforts as leverage in its appeals to Turkey 
to utilize the Northern Option, which would have allowed the US to send troops through Turkey’s 
southeastern border into northern Iraq. The benefits of Turkish accession are many for the US; Turkey 
has often served as the US's ultimate model for a secular, predominantly Muslim democracy within the 
                                                 
7
 Although many EU countries, most notably France and Germany, are hesitant to grant Turkish accession for this precise 
reason. France and Germany should reconsider, since providing Turkey with more authority would allow the EU to use 
Turkey as a conduit to the energy resource rich Middle East. 
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region. Turkey has also committed to fighting radicalism in the Middle East by teaming up with the US 
and several other nations to create a $200 million fund that would direct programs in designated 
hotspots.
8
 The US supports Turkish inclusion for a variety of Middle Eastern security reasons. The EU, 
however, is “much more inward-oriented and… tends to view Turkey more as a security liability than 
as a security asset…”9 Turkish integration into Europe is being held up. 
Trouble in Europe 
 Turkey has a long history with the EU. Joining the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952, 
and the European Economic Commission as an associate member in 1963, it has been a member of 
many essential European institutions. In 1987, Turkey submitted an application to the European 
Economic Community, but the application was postponed because Turkey’s poor relations with Greece 
and the conflict with Cyprus. Turkish-EU relations hit a low-point when, in 1997, the EU included 
Greek Cyprus as a candidate country for membership, in spite of US pressure to the contrary.
10
 The 
Turks took particular affront to this act due to of the history of conflict between Turkish Cyprus and 
Greek Cyprus. To the Turkish mind, by accepting Greek Cyprus as a candidate for membership, the EU 
was taking a position in the Cyprus dispute. The EU was able to somewhat ameliorate the problem in 
1999 at the Helsinki summit by admitting Turkey to the list of candidate countries. Since that summit, 
Turkey has passed numerous resolutions aimed at reforming its political, economic, and social 
apparatuses to meet EU expectations, although there have been interruptions, with accession chapters 
being frozen by vetoes from France and Germany on several occasions. While the EU’s admittance of 
Turkey has many potential benefits for Turkey, the process has slowed.  
The EU has slowed the Turkish accession negotiations for years, due to lack of consensus 
                                                 
8
 Schmitt, “U.S. and Turkey to Create Fund to Stem Extremism”  
9
 Öniş and Yilmaz, “The Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?” 272. 
10
 Yeşilada, “Turkey's Candidacy for the EU,” 96. 
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within the EU on Turkey’s place in Europe. While some countries, such as Britain and Italy, support 
Turkish accession, other countries, which include Germany and Austria, are much more hesitant, due to 
immigration concerns. While the British government supports Turkish accession, there are still some 
parties that oppose it. The British far-right United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which has 
nine of the seventy-three UK seats in the European Parliament, is one such party. In keeping with other 
far-right parties, such as the Dutch Party for Freedom and French National Front, UKIP is also 
extremely Euro-skeptic and would naturally oppose Turkish accession. In addition to most of center-
right and some left parties, these parties claim that Turkish Islamic culture is incompatible with 
Western Europe; they used the same argument of incompatibility with European culture when opposing 
the accession of Poland and other Eastern European nations. While the clash of culture certainly plays a 
role in the stalling of Turkish accession, it is only a small part of the story. The EU at large tends to 
view Turkey through the lens of its impact on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), employment, 
and deliberations in the European Parliament.
11
  
 Turkish inclusion into the EU could pose problems due to the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy. The two major goals of the CAP are to supply direct payments to farmers for stabilizing the 
risks involved with farming, and rural development. It is likely that Turkish admission would cause the 
EU high budget outlays from direct payment to Turkish farmers, but only for the first few years.
12
 
Turkey would benefit more under the second pillar, as the EU payments would help to enhance rural 
infrastructure.
13
 It is important to keep in mind that these conclusions are tentative as it is likely that 
CAP rules will change before Turkish accession. 
 Turkey would be one of the most populous EU nations, which would put it at odds in European 
Parliament with the other large states, such as Germany and France. France is also hesitant due to fears 
                                                 
11
 Öniş and Yilmaz, “The Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?” 272.  
12
 Grethe, “Turkey’s Accession to the EU: What will the Common Agricultural Policy Cost?” 134 
13
 Ibid. 135. 
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of large scale immigration from Turkey. Germany and Austria have sizeable Turkish populations and so 
are worried about immigration consequences as well. As she considers Turkey unready for full 
membership, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has opted to push for a privileged partnership rather 
than full membership at this time, but as one EU scholar states, “Any form of quasi-membership is 
rightfully of as little interest to Turkey as it was to other applicants.”14 It is necessary to consider that 
this privileged partnership would serve to keep Turkey away from competing with Germany in the 
European Parliament.  
 Reflecting the lack of agreement among Europe’s biggest players, the smaller European states 
are far from a consensus on the Turkish question. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and the 
Baltic states are divided in terms of their opposition to and support for Turkey, while Poland and 
Romania, as “two of the largest entrants since 2000, have publicly stated their support for Turkey’s 
application”; they “are[,] [however,] wary of the competition for EU subsidies that would be provided 
by such a large country.”15 The concern by smaller European states about culture, which have been 
appropriated by far-right parties, is without merit. While accepting Turkey “would increase the Muslim 
element of the total EU population from the current 3 per cent to approximately 20 per cent[,]… only a 
sizeable minority, and mostly located within Turkey… [T]he Islamic presence…-would hardly be more 
visible than it is now.”16  
 European resistance to Turkish accession is insulting to the Turkish public. It has also been 
noticed by Turkey that it is the only state which is required to meet the acquis, the legislation of the 
EU, prior to accession negotiations. The snub of questioning Turkey's belonging in Europe has not 
gone unnoticed by domestic Turkish actors or their constituents: “Remarks by European politicians that 
Turkey is not European are considered humiliating. Euroskepticism has grown in the party system. 
                                                 
14
 John Redmond, “Turkey and the European Union: Troubled European or European Trouble?” 312. 
15
 Ibid. 309. 
16
 Ibid. 313. 
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Opposition parties are increasingly criticizing the membership accession process.”17 Support among the 
Turkish public for EU accession has dropped from 73 percent in 2004 to 44 percent in 2013.
18
  
The AKP Turns Eastward 
 With internal politics stalling accession and the foreign policy leadership’s determination to 
create a regional role for the country, it is no surprise that Turkey decided to explore the Middle East. 
The decline of Turkish public support and Turkey’s increasing clout within the Middle East have 
rendered bowing to EU accession demands without a definite timeline to accession, as well as bearing 
affronts from France and Germany, politically untenable as it might jeopardize the AKP’s immense 
public support. 
 
The Kurdish Question 
 
 The Kurdish Question is of constant concern to both the domestic and foreign security 
apparatuses of Turkey. The Kemalist establishment made it abundantly clear that when it comes to 
guaranteeing Turkey’s territorial integrity, the Kurdish Question is of the utmost importance. Due to the 
Kurdish Question’s importance, Turkey paid extremely close attention to the policies of other countries 
when they addressed their Kurdish nationalist groups.  
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was established in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan and has been 
fighting Turkey to establish a Kurdish state. The PKK is a terrorist organization and has been the 
greatest domestic threat to Turkish stability. The reason that the PKK issue is such a central element of 
Turkish foreign policy is neatly described by Kardaş: “No longer preoccupied with the issues of 
                                                 
17
 Bürgin, “Disappointment or New Strength: Exploring the Declining EU Support Among Turkish Students, Academics, 
and Party Members,” 568. 
18
 German Marshall Fund, “Transatlantic Trends 2013,” 46. 
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survival and existential security, Turkey has been less dependent on the Western community and more 
comfortable developing closer economic ties with its neighbors. Turkey's major remaining security 
concern in the Middle East is the regional dimension of the PKK threat.”19 Turkey has focused its 
attention on the Middle East in an effort to more adequately address the security threat that the PKK 
represents. For the majority of the 1990s, relations with Iran, Iraq, and Syria were tainted by PKK-
related issues. Turkey’s relationship with Iraq was strained by the Iraq War, PKK presence in Northern 
Iraq, and Iraq’s recognition—within its 2005 constitution—of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG) in Erbil. These tensions were soothed when Iraq and Turkey finally came to an agreement to 
end terrorism in Iraq, particularly the PKK. Iraq saw more advantages to a good relationship with 
Turkey by ending the PKK presence in the region. After Iran and Syria stopped their support for the 
PKK in the early 2000s, they developed a cooperative economic relationship with Turkey. 
Iran and Syria 
 Due to the support of both Iran and Syria in the PKK’s fostering of instability throughout 
Turkey, Turkish relations with these nations had been marred throughout the preceding decades. Syrian 
support for the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan occurred for three reasons. The first of these 
reasons is that Syria and the Soviet Union were allies, and since the PKK adhered to a Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, the Soviet Union also supported the PKK.
20
 The second reason is that Turkey pursued a water 
irrigation project that Syria worried could be used to prevent Syria from accessing water. Syria 
supported the PKK as leverage against such an eventuality.
21
 The Turkish alliance with the US, as well 
as Turkey’s warm relations with Israel, were also causes for Syria’s destabilization efforts. Based on 
factors such as the fall of the Soviet Union and Turkey’s assurances that Syria’s access to water would 
                                                 
19
 Kardaş, “Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Drawing Sandcastles?” 118. 
20
 Aras, “The Role of Motivation in the Success of Coercive Diplomacy: The 1998 Turkish-Syrian Crisis as a Case Study,” 
210. 
21
 Ibid.  
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not be limited, along with Turkish soldiers positioned on the Syrian border, Syria ceased its support of 
the PKK in 1998 through the signing of the Adana Accord. As a part of this agreement, Syria agreed to 
shut down PKK camps in the Bekaa Valley and eject Öcalan forever.
22
 Syria-Turkey relations have 
warmed steadily since then, and before the internal Syrian crisis, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad 
made numerous trips to Istanbul to meet with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
 While there were warm relations between Iran and Turkey during the reign of the Shah, their 
relationship deteriorated quickly after the Islamic Revolution. After the revolution Iran considered 
Turkey an enemy state in league with the US.
23
 For this reason, Iran became a sponsor of the PKK in 
the 1980s and 1990s; however, when Iran started to face security challenges from the Party of Free Life 
of Kurdistan (PJAK), the Iranian branch of the PKK, Iranian policy saw Turkey as the lesser of two 
evils.
24
 Turkey and Iran entered into High Security Commission meetings where they discussed the 
fight against the PKK and PJAK, and in April of 2008, signed a joint statement declaring their intent to 
work together to end the terrorism of both the PKK and the PJAK.
25
 With tensions over security 
concerns relaxed, Turkey and Iran began to develop extensive trade relations in natural resources, the 
main resource being natural gas.  
The Iraq War 
 The 2003 War in Iraq has fostered a lot of tension between Turkey and the West, the US in 
particular. This is largely the result of the failure of the March 3 Resolution in Turkish parliament in 
2003. The resolution would have allowed the US military to utilize the Northern Option into Iraq for 
the invasion. In a very narrow vote, the resolution failed. Blame for this failure has been attributed to 
AKP leadership ineffectively pressuring AKP members to vote in favor of the resolution.
26
 The official 
                                                 
22
 Ibid. 219. 
23
 Final Report of the Institute of Politics, “United States-Turkey-Iran: Strategic Options for the Coming Decade,” 79. 
24 Yeşilyurt and Akdevioğlu, “Turkey's Middle East Policy Under the JDP Rule,” 65. 
25
 Karacasulu and Karakir, “Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement,”115. 
26
 Migdalovitz, “Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of U.S. Forces, and Related Issues,” 25. 
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reason promoted by Turkey, however, was that it was in agreement with international consensus, which 
deemed the war unjust. This position helped to enhance Turkey’s reputation in the Middle East.27 It is 
highly likely that the decision was also greatly influenced by Turkish politicians’ recollection of the last 
time that Turkey aided the US in a war. During the first Gulf War in 1990, Prime Minister Turgut Özal 
sent 100,000 troops to secure the Iraqi-Turkish border, allowed the US to fly sorties using Turkish 
airspace, and participated in sanctions against Iraq. Through his acquiescence to the US, Özal hoped to 
reap specific benefits. Such benefits included creating a closer defense alliance with the US and 
increasing Turkey's stature in the eyes of the European Community.
28
 It turns out that he miscalculated. 
By going along with US sanctions, the Turkish economy lost billions in trade and did not gain any of 
the benefits that Özal thought Turkey would receive.
29
 This alliance also caused a resurgence of PKK-
led violence. The creation of a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq in 1991 breathed new life into the 
separatist activities of the PKK.  
 This was the root of the Turkish parliament's decision regarding the March 3 Resolution; in 
addition to suffering economically, Turkey faced increased violence from their foray into the First Gulf 
War. Even though there was a ceasefire in 1999 between the PKK and Turkey, Turkish fears that the 
invasion would destabilize Iraq and give the PKK an opportunity to cement a presence in Iraq's 
northern territory prevailed. Though destabilization did not occur, the PKK still obtained a presence 
within Northern Iraq. As noted by Yeşilada and Akdevioğlu, “[t]he most important regional problem 
that the JDP [Justice and Development Party (AKP)] inherited from the previous era was the PKK's 
existence in Northern Iraq and [the] possibility of [the] establishment of a Kurdish state in that region 
under the leadership of KDP-PUK [Kurdistan Democratic Party-Patriotic Union of Kurdistan].”30 Some 
                                                 
27
 Aras, “Turkey's Rise in the Greater Middle East,” 38. 
28
 Larrabee, “Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,” 105. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Yeşilada and Akdevioğlu, “Turkey's Middle East Policy Under the JDP Rule,” 58. 
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of Turkey's fears were realized in the aftermath of the invasion in 2003 when the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) was reconvened in Erbil; if the US's unwillingness to force the government in 
Erbil to address PKK groups in the region is considered along with this fact, Turkey's discontent 
becomes understandable. This conflict hit its height during the Sulaymaniyah incident—dubbed Çuval 
Olayı (The Hood Event) by Turkish media—on July 4, 2003. A group of Turkish soldiers were caught 
by the US military in Northern Iraq planning to assassinate the Iraqi-Kurdish governor of Kirkuk. The 
US led away the conspirators with hoods over their heads and released them into Turkish military 
custody after sixty hours. While this mishap went relatively unnoticed by Western media, it definitely 
left its mark on Turkish entertainment and news, as Turks felt insulted that their US allies would treat 
Turkish troops in such a manner. Newspapers in Turkey printed headlines calling the US forces 
“Rambos” and “ugly Americans,” the Turkish army chief of staff declared a “crisis of confidence” 
between Turkey and the US.
31
 Several novels and even a feature-length movie, Valley of the Wolves: 
Iraq, were made about the Hood Event. As Baran suggests within her discussion surrounding the film, 
these works greatly exaggerated the event’s details: “Valley of the Wolves: Iraq became a blockbuster, 
with its portrayal of US Troops in Iraq as bloodthirsty Christian fundamentalists who enjoy 
slaughtering Iraqis.”32 The movie’s initial scene depicted an exaggerated version of the Hood Event 
that was understood by notable AKP figures, such as the Prime Minister’s wife Ermine Erdoğan, 
Speaker of Parliament Bülent Arınç, and Parliament’s Human Rights Commission Chairman Mehmet 
Elkatmış, to be an accurate reenactment of the event and the Iraq War.33 It was a low-point for 
diplomatic relations between the US and Turkey and reinforced negative sentiments, throughout both 
the Turkish public and government, concerning the US and its policies within the region. 
 The US preferred stability in the KRG to driving out the PKK, and Turkey’s successive 
                                                 
31
 Howard, “US Arrest of Soldiers Infuriates Turkey.” 
32
 Baran, Torn Country: Turkey Between Secularism and Islamism, 131. 
33
 Ibid. 132. 
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attempts to gain US approval for raids into Northern Iraq were denied.
34
 Due to Turkey’s inability to 
cajole the US into addressing the PKK problem in Northern Iraq more aggressively, as well as the fact 
that only 9 percent of the Turkish public viewed the US favorably,
35
 the AKP decided to take more 
forceful action. The AKP began to assert the right to orchestrate raids across the Iraqi-Turkish border in 
November of 2007 to attack PKK training camps.
36
 This increased hostility proved short-lived; the 
Erbil government closed all the PKK offices. The AKP began using diplomatic methods in addition to 
its military actions to reach a more permanent solution. After several meetings with Iraqi Prime 
Minister Maliki, Iraq and Turkey came to an agreement on the necessity of ending terrorism in Iraq.
37
  
 With the PKK issue no longer tainting Turkey’s relations with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, these 
countries were able to enter into a new era. Turkey began strengthening trade relations with all three. 
While Turkey’s relations with Syria have been hampered due to the internal Syrian crisis, Turkey’s 
trade with Iran and Iraq has grown.  
 
Economics 
 
 During Turkey's 2001 financial crisis, capital fled Turkey. The economy contracted by 7.4 
percent, leading to the highest unemployment in two decades. The Turkish Lira devalued by 50 percent, 
95 percent of the population’s incomes and savings were negatively impacted, and the number of 
people below the poverty line increased past the numbers recorded in 1994.
38
 After the AKP swept into 
power, it was in a difficult situation. The only way to fix the shambles of the economy was to adhere to 
the IMF's restructuring program, which was deeply unpopular. The AKP criticized the IMF plan to save 
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face in front of its constituency, but it largely accepted the program with only minute adjustments.
39
 
This discontent permitted Erdoğan to enact Davutoğlu's vision of a greater and more economically 
assertive Turkey. Under AKP leadership, the economy rebounded and grew so much that Turkey 
became the nominal seventeenth largest economy in the world. Davutoğlu has vowed to lead the 
Turkish economy into the world's top ten economies by the Republic’s centennial in 2023.40 In its 
efforts to expand the economy, the AKP made historic strides in developing trade relations with its 
Middle Eastern neighbors. Energy also plays a key role here; bereft of natural resources, Turkey has 
had to approach the Middle East to sustain its growth and limit dependence on Russia.  
Economic Collapse and Recovery  
 As soon as the worst of the economic crisis was averted, Turkey’s attention was drawn to 
increasing its exports. This is where the Middle East became important. It was in this particular area 
that a significant base of the AKP, the business community, lobbied for economic penetration into the 
Middle East. With stalled EU talks, the Middle East was beginning to look inviting.  
 As previously stated, the AKP's primary goal upon election was to fix the economy. From 2002 
to 2005, GDP growth increased from 5 percent to 8 percent and GDP per capita increased from $8,000 
to $11,500.
41
 In 2009, GDP growth had fallen due to the worldwide economic recession to -5 percent, 
and GDP per capita was down from $15,000 the year before to $14,000.
42
 By 2011, however, Turkey 
had recovered substantially to 9 percent GDP growth and GDP per capita had increased to $17,000.
43
 
Academics have noted that trade is taking on a greater role in foreign policy calculation.
44
 Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, has said in interviews that not only has foreign policy been greatly 
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influenced by business needs, but also that the interdependence fostered by mutual business interests 
creates “order” in the region.45 This is a notable shift in the political culture of Turkey. For most of 
Turkey’s history it considered itself beset on all sides by potential enemies, Turkey now seeks to 
develop its neighbors into friends and potential trading partners. During the Özal government, there 
was a similar attitude, but Özal had to contend with an isolationist security establishment and the PKK 
issue kept him from thoroughly engaging with the Middle East.
46
  
 Turkish rapprochement with Syria began when Syria expelled Abdullah Öcalan, and it has 
steadily increased since then. Bashar-al Assad became close friends with Prime Minister Erdoğan, a 
relationship which translated itself into improved economic cooperation between their respective 
countries and a free trade agreement in 2004. As a result, in 2007 Turkish trade with Syria increased to 
$1.2 billion from $797 million in 2006. The current internal crisis in Syria, however, has not been good 
for the trade relationship. In 2011 Turkey suspended the free trade agreement until the Assad 
government steps down. The trade balance between Turkey and Syria decreased from $1.1 billion in 
2011 to $430 million in 2012.
47
 
 From 2003 to 2006, 20 percent of the trade fairs that Turkey participated in at the national level 
were held in the Middle East. This increased to 24 percent in 2007 and to 30 percent in 2009. Free-
trade agreements were signed with Morocco, Tunisia, Palestine, and Syria in 2004 and with Egypt in 
2005. In addition, joint business councils were formed with Syria and Palestine in 2000, Iraq and Iran 
in 2001, Lebanon in 2002, Saudi Arabia in 2003, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in 2005, and 
Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman in 2006.
48
  
The Middle Eastern share of Turkey’s foreign trade increased from 8.5 percent in 2003 to 17.16 
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percent in 2010.
49
 In that same time, the European share has decreased from 53.6 percent to 41.6 
percent. Turkish businesses have also invested heavily in the Middle East. In September of 2009, over 
500 Turkish firms invested in Northern Iraq, an act which resulted in Turkish trade in in the area 
reaching $5.2 billion. Foreign Trade Minister Zafer Çağlayan asserts that this will grow to $20 billion 
by 2014.
50
 The majority of these businesses is in construction, and over the last decade over $35.5 
billion was invested by Turkish construction firms in the Middle East.
51
  
Following the 2001 economic crisis, the newly elected AKP not only enacted the required IMF 
reforms, it also embarked on an unprecedented campaign to develop trade relations with the Middle 
East. These campaigns were largely successful and helped to land Turkey as the seventeenth largest 
economy in the world. In order to sustain this economic growth, Turkey had to increase its energy 
imports. Iran and Iraq play an important role here. 
 Energy 
 Energy is an important issue for Turkey since—being completely barren of any natural fossil 
fuel resources—it has to import most of its energy needs. As a result, it is the recipient of the dubious 
honor of having the most expensive gasoline in the world.
52
 This has forced Turkey to engage with the 
Middle East for natural resources. It seeks to limit reliance on Russia and has sought greater energy ties 
with Iran as a result. Turkey has learned that Iran is not a great energy partner either; Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia have become the most promising leads. 
With the tensions between Iran and Turkey that were caused by PKK security issues resolved, 
Iran and Turkey have begun collaborating on a number of energy deals. Turkey looks to Iran for natural 
gas in an effort to limit its dependence upon Russian natural gas, which accounted for 65 percent of 
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Turkey’s imports in 2008.53 To limit its dependence on Russian energy supplies, Turkey signed two 
energy deals with Iran in 2007: one gave the Turkish Petroleum Corporation rights to explore oil and 
natural gas fields in Iran, and the other approved a pipeline from Iran that transferred gas from 
Turkmenistan to Turkey.
54
 These deals have lowered the Russian share of natural gas imports from 65 
percent in 2008 to 58 percent in 2011.
55
 Yet it is predicted that if Turkey cannot find other states, such 
as Iraq and Turkmenistan, from which to import natural gas, the Russian share could reach 80 percent 
within the next few years.
56
 
 As Turkey seeks to limit its reliance on Russia, oil plays a significant role within its energy-
based relationship with Iran. In 2009, Turkey imported 3200 tons of crude oil from Iran.
 57
 This 
increased to 9300 tons from Iran in 2011--representing 51 percent of Turkey’s oil imports--but then fell 
in 2012 as more oil was imported from Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
58
 As Turkish dependence on the Middle 
East for oil has intensified, Russia’s share of Turkish oil imports has fallen markedly. In 2009, 41 
percent of Turkish oil imports came from Russia, but, as of 2012, it fell to 11 percent.
59
 Oil imports 
from Iraq have increased from 12 percent in 2010 to 19 percent in 2012. 
 Turkey’s energy choices are not good. With no natural resources of significance, it must engage 
with Iran and Russia to supply its growing natural gas and oil needs. Iran and Russia, however, are not 
always the most reliable energy suppliers and sporadically take advantage of their positions, often 
failing to deliver shipments in a timely fashion, or to fulfill the amounts specified in contracts. These 
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two countries are the easiest from which to receive energy, but as long as the Turkish economy 
continues to grow, Turkey will look even more closely at developing better diplomatic and natural 
resource trade relations with suppliers in the Middle East—such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia—in order to 
limit their dependence on Iran and Russia.  
  
 
Implications for US Foreign Policy 
 
 US foreign policy in the Middle East has been primarily concerned with security, and, due to 
the largely negative opinions that the Arab world has of American intervention, Turkey can function as 
an excellent model for the area surrounding it. And with the US’s foreign policy Asia Pivot, it needs a 
reliable partner to continue pursuing American interests in the region. As Field and Zahedi suggest, 
Turkey represents the change that America wishes to see in the region: 
 “In short, a Muslim political party has come to power democratically on the back of a rising 
Muslim middle class engaged with the international economy and by promoting Western values. This is 
precisely the model promoted in the lofty rhetoric of the Bush Freedom Agenda, but which the US 
conspicuously had no actual capacity to produce. Turkey is both willing and able to promote this model 
throughout the Middle East and the US should back it strongly in doing so.”60  
 The AKP elections are contested by some Turks as being corrupt; however, these allegations are 
largely without merit. Several international organizations, including the EU, congratulated the AKP and 
Prime Minister Erdoğan on their substantial electoral victories in the elections of 2011. President 
Barack Obama even called the Prime Minister to express his congratulations. Furthermore, while some 
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AKP actions concerning protesters and press freedoms should be noted and addressed, it does not keep 
Turkey from being an overall good model for a Middle Eastern democracy. 
An overwhelming portion of the Arab public views the US with suspicion and mistrust. 
Meanwhile, the Middle East increasingly views Turkey more positively and Prime Minister Erdoğan is 
the most admired among world leaders.
61
 Turkey has the capacity to serve US interests in the region. 
There is, however, an enormous obstacle in the way: the US government is largely unpopular with the 
Turkish public. Over 70 percent of Turks believe US foreign policy to have a negative impact on the 
world, and 40 percent consider the US an enemy state.
62
 This is not only due to the immense negative 
press garnered from the Hood Event of July 2003. After the invasion of Iraq, Turkey and its struggle 
against the PKK was largely abandoned by the US as the US sought to not alienate its Kurdish support 
in the KRG. Though the problems with the PKK in the KRG have been resolved, ill feelings remain 
due to what the Turkish public saw as the massive hypocrisy of the US: “Just as the U.S. was preaching 
the need for unity in the fight against terrorism, its war to pre-empt a largely fabricated threat in Iraq 
caused a tremendous upsurge in the very real threat posed to Turkey by the PKK.”63 Accordingly, 
public opinion regarding the US fell through the floor. It should be a top priority of the State 
Department to rehabilitate its image in Turkey. The high level of distrust and suspicion among Turkish 
citizens will make relations more difficult than they already are.  
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Conclusions 
 
    Massive economic discontent allowed the AKP to sweep into office and embark on an 
ambitious economic program. The party's foreign policy was the brain child of Ahmet Davutoğlu, one 
of the most influential figures in the founding of the organization,. With his foreign policy, Davutoğlu 
wished to reach out to the Middle East in an effort to accept Turkey’s Ottoman past, as well as to move 
forward economically and politically. In tandem with EU accession stalling—due to internal politics 
and the fall of Turkish public support—the feeling of abandonment by the US in the aftermath of the 
Iraq War only served to reinforce Turkish ambitions in the region. As Turkey turned its attention and its 
businesses towards the Middle East, it strengthened its vision of itself as a leading regional power-
holder. After meeting with much economic success for their risk, the platform of Eastern expansion is 
upheld and policies independent of the West are maintained. 
 The US should tread cautiously here. Through its newfound assertiveness, Turkey is making it 
clear that the states of the Middle East need not be consigned to economic stagnation and political 
repression; as the AKP would like to teach it, you can be religious and be politically successful. Arab 
public opinion shows that they view the Turkish success story favorably, and as the economic arm of 
Turkey furthers its reach into these regions, Arab states will be more likely to lend Turkey their ears. 
Turkey will likely be more cautious in this respect. As its relationship with Syria's Assad has shown, 
“zero problems with neighbors” does not necessarily mean that neighbors will always listen and take 
heed. 
 The US should take advantage of this Turco-philia by first rehabilitating its image within 
Turkey. As long as a majority of the Turkish public and its officials regard the US with suspicion, it will 
be difficult for the US to acquire Turkish cooperation where it might conflict with Turkey’s interests. 
The US needs to push for the major EU powers to stop stalling and make more definitive efforts 
22 
 
  
 
towards establishing Turkish membership. If France or Germany were to come out in support of 
Turkish membership, it would help to change the Turkish public’s perception of the Union and set a 
renegotiation process in motion. However, if this takes too long and Turkey is able to further solidify its 
clout within the region, it may no longer be interested in membership. The Kurdish Question still plays 
an enormous role in foreign policy formulation, and the latest ceasefire from the PKK allows for 
cautious optimism that the struggle could finally be nearing its end. The US did not allow Turkey to 
pursue the PKK, nor did it lobby hard to get the KRG to dislodge the PKK, and its image has suffered 
horribly in Turkey as a result. 
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